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BURYING THE HATCHET IN BURIAL DISPUTES:
APPLYING ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
TO DISPUTES CONCERNING THE
INTERMENT OF BODIES
Brian L. Josias*




The calm serenity that surely accompanies the eternal sleep of
death deposits in its earthly wake the potential for a calamitous dis-
pute between those left behind: what to do with the deceased's body?
Many are familiar with the recent dispute baseball great Ted Wil-
liams's children engaged in over how to inter his earthly remains. 2
Inspired by the Williams controversy, this Note examines the
processes of resolving conflicts that emerge in the wake of the death
of a human being, focusing on clashes that arise regarding burial ar-
rangements. In addition, controversies concerning organ donation
will be considered at length. Technological developments suggest
that in the future these decisions will continue to be cause for dispute
as burial methods change, costs increase, and the demand for
donated organs increases.
This Note attempts to compare and contrast current methods of
dispute resolution with available alternative mechanisms. I examine
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2004; B.A., The Johns
Hopkins University, 2001. I would like to thank Professor Tom Patrick for his
valuable comments and insight. I also would like to thank my parents for all their
support and whose dedication and commitment to the value of education serve as a
constant inspiration while I pursue my studies.
I Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Jean Baptiste LeRoy (Nov. 13, 1789), quoted
in BEN FRANKLIN LAUGHING 57 (P.M. Zall ed., 1980).
2 See, e.g., Raja Mishra, Williams Children Settle Dispute, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 21,
2002, at B1; see also infra notes 67-86 and accompanying text.
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the current dispute resolution model considering the processes by
which disputes between interested parties are resolved. Are alterna-
tive methods such as mediation and arbitration currently being used
to resolve these arguments? This Note considers whether those "alter-
native" methods have proven themselves appropriate and effective in
this area. I argue that this area is one which highly recommends itself
to the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR). However, struc-
tural barriers have prevented widespread implementation and use of
ADR to provide effective solutions to these problems. Conventional
methods have proven themselves ill suited to respond to the complex
interests presented and are incapable of dealing with the multiplicity
of parties who have some stake in the outcome of these conflicts. De-
mand for crafting and applying appropriate dispute resolution mecha-
nisms is particularly acute for this context. I conclude by suggesting
that the weaknesses of conventional methods to resolve burial dis-
putes illustrate that several other types of conflicts would benefit from
a reexamination of the dispute resolution techniques employed there.
In particular, disputes that involve multiple parties with highly emo-
tional interests and no clear "right" answer recommend themselves
most to the use of narrowly tailored dispute resolution techniques.
Part I identifies the issues that are likely to arise following one's
death. I describe what burial options are available and explore why
these options are cause for dispute. Detailed attention is also devoted
to an examination of the growing field of organ donation and dis-
putes that emerge concerning organ donation decisions. In addition,
Part I explores the identities of the interested parties, and later seg-
ments discuss how various models of dispute resolution represent or
fail to represent the interests of those potential disputants. A particu-
lar feature of the burial dispute context is also dealt with: the problem
of the absent interested party-namely, the deceased.
Having established the issues that pervade burial controversies,
Part II begins to examine conventional methods for resolving these
disputes. This Part features an introduction of several case studies to
demonstrate traditional methods of dealing with these fusses. I iden-
tify five primary shortcomings of the traditional model in resolving
burial disputes.
Part III suggests alternatives to the traditional model. Various
models of alternative dispute resolution will be introduced, focusing
primarily on arbitration and mediation. This section describes both
the ADR movement in general and specific ADR processes, including
their origins, goals, and some criticisms. Part IV attempts to demon-
strate what types of nontraditional dispute resolution would be most
applicable to these highly peculiar disputes. The argument focuses on
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resolution techniques that combine speed with an ability to entertain
viewpoints from many diverse parties while recognizing the limited
solutions to the problem.
This Note concludes by showing how the use of alternatives in
this field of dispute resolution recommends itself not only to analo-
gous types of disputes, but also to disputes that do not share the same
characteristics as the burial controversy. However, my argument does
not stretch so far as to recommend use of alternative techniques in all
contexts, but instead suggests that barriers that prevent its utilization
in this type of dispute may exist elsewhere. Particularly, I believe that
the failure of traditional adjudication to deal with burial disputes sug-
gests that the "one-size-fits-all" approach to traditional adjudication is
seriously flawed. In similar contexts, I recommend that this approach
needs to be reevaluated and reformed to lower barriers to the usage
of more appropriate dispute resolution mechanisms, and I offer sev-
eral methods to lower barriers to ADR usage.
I. DESCRIPTION OF ISSUES THAT COULD GIVE RISE TO DISPUTES
First, a comment about what this Note does not discuss. The con-
troversies that arise from the actual termination of one's life, such as
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide, are beyond the scope of this
Note. There is an enormous body of scholarship and case law associ-
ated with that topic, and it has been the subject of enormous discus-
sion.3 In addition, reams of scholarship suggest the potential for
3 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (holding that an as-
serted right to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest
protected by the Due Process Clause); Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S.
261 (1990) (holding that the U.S. Constitution does not forbid a state from requiring
that evidence of an incompetent's wish as to the withdrawal of life-sustaining treat-
ment be proved by clear and convincing evidence); Ronald Dworkin, Euthanasia, Mo-
rality, and Law, Fritz B. Burns Lecture (Nov. 22, 1996), in 31 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1147,
1154 (1998) (noting that "it's very important that we understand the strengths and
limits of the supposed distinction that is often described as the distinction between
killing and letting die"); Ezekiel J. Emanuel, The Future of Euthanasia and Physician-
Assisted Suicide, 82 MINN. L. REv. 983, 984 (1998) (arguing that "[t]he debate needs to
move away from this or that heart-wrenching case calling out for euthanasia, shake off
the distortions concerning end-of-life practices that have so far informed it, and care-
fully examine what likely benefits and harms might result from legalization"); Neil M.
Gorsuch, The Right to Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia, 23 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 599,
606 (2000) (suggesting that "whether the venue isjudicial or legislative, the appropri-
ate line society should draw-and today largely does draw-is between acts intended
to kill and acts where no such intention exists"); Cynthia M. Bumgardner, Comment,
Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide in the United States and the Netherlands, 10 IND.
INT'L & COMP. L. Rrv. 387, 388-89 (2000) (arguing that "[l1egalizing either euthana-
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utilizing alternative dispute resolution to help resolve end of life is-
sues.4 However, I do not focus on that scholarship or enter that de-
bate. Instead, I concentrate my discussion on the disputes that arise
out of interring the body in its final resting place.
A. Options
Death is a certainty for all of us at some point.5 Every human
being on the planet will die. It is true that recent advances in science,
medicine, and technology have enabled humans to extend their life
spans dramatically. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the average
American male born in 1999 will live seventy-four years and the aver-
age female seventy-nine. 6 Yet, in spite of these advances, we will all
meet our end at some point and our corporal remains must be dis-
posed of somehow. In addition to the certainty of our own death and
burial, at some point it is highly likely that we will be required to par-
ticipate in the planning or execution of a loved one's funeral.
7
Death is unlike any other phenomenon that we encounter on this
planet-and courts and the law recognize this. There are issues asso-
ciated with death that do not appear in other contexts, as Justice
Lumpkin artfully stated:
Death is unique. It is unlike aught else in its certainty and its
incidents. A corpse in some respects is the strangest thing on earth.
A man who but yesterday breathed and thought and walked among
us has passed away. Something has gone. The body is left still and
cold, and is all that is visible to mortal eye of the man we knew.
Around it cling love and memory. Beyond it may reach hope.
8
Yet, in spite of its unique nature, the law and human beings must
deal with death:
sia or PAS [physician-assisted suicide] or both violates the Americans With Disabilities
Act as well as the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution").
4 See, e.g., Diane E. Hoffmann, Mediating Life and Death Decisions, 36 A~iz. L. REV.
821, 826 (1994) (concluding that "there is reason to be cautious about the application
of mediation to termination of life support cases," yet "conced[ing] that there may be
a small number of cases where mediation is appropriate, in particular, disputes be-
tween relatives of an incapacitated patient").
5 The other, as noted earlier, is the payment of taxes. Interestingly, this other
certainty also leads to many conflicts. However, in that case there is a well settled and
noncontroversial method for resolving conflicts.
6 See U.S. CENSUS BuREAu, STATIsTIcAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 72
(2002).
7 See HUGH Y. BERNARD, THE LAW OF DEATH AND DisPosAL OF THE DEAD 23 (2d
ed. 1979) (noting that "[flew adults who live to mature years... do not, at least once,
experience the necessity of making funeral arrangements for someone").
8 Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Wilson, 51 S.E. 24, 25 (Ga. 1905).
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It must be laid away. And the law-that rule of action which
touches all human things-must touch also this thing of death. It is
not surprising that the law relating to this mystery of what death
leaves behind cannot be precisely brought within the letter of all
the rules regarding corn, lumber and pig iron. And yet the body
must be buried or disposed of.... And the law, in its all-sufficiency,
must furnish some rule, by legislative enactment or analogy, or
based on some sound legal principle, by which to determine be-
tween the living questions of the disposition of the dead and rights
surrounding their bodies. In doing this the courts will not close
their eyes to the customs and necessities of civilization in dealing
with the dead and those sentiments connected with decently dispos-
ing of the remains of the departed which furnish one ground of
difference between men and brutes.
9
Because of the unique nature of death, there are hosts of issues,
legal and otherwise, which arise upon the death of a person. For ex-
ample, as to burial, disputes may arise as to timing, manner, location,
and type. The law in most states requires that all bodies be buried
shortly after death.1 0 This requirement adds focus to the remainder
of this Note. Time acts as a secret third party in all of the issues that
develop over disposal of bodies. However, there is a great irony in the
rush to "get the body in the ground." The deceased, once interred or
disposed of, must remain in that state for, conceivably, the rest of
eternity.
The finality of most interment decisions is another factor at play
that adds pressure to the decisions made at the time of death and
creates another ingredient in the recipe for conflict. Decisions made
regarding disposal of a body are difficult to undo. Public policy and
human nature frowns on disturbing the remains of the deceased and
"courts throughout the land look with disfavor upon the disinterment
and removal of the body."11
Just a small listing of the options underlies the realm of possibili-
ties for conflict to develop. Among the available options are crema-
tions, conventional interment in the ground, and interment in a
9 Id.
10 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-64 (2003) (stating that "the body shall be buried,
removed or cremated "within a reasonable time after death"); see also BERNARD, supra
note 7, at 25 (stating that "[a]n example is Arizona, where a body may not be kept
more than 48 hours after death unless it is embalmed or stored at below 32 degrees");
PERCIVAL E. JACKSON, THE LAw OF CADAvERS 60 (1950) (noting that "[o]rdinary re-
quirements of health import the necessity of burial within a reasonable time").
11 RAYMOND LOUIS BRENNAN, THE LAw GOVERNING CEMETERY RULES AND REGULA-
TIONS 66 (2d ed. 1951).
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sarcophagus above ground or the newest method: cryogenic
freezing.' 2
A brief exploration of the issues that may arise from the selection
of the different methods is appropriate here. To begin with, a defini-
tion of some of the terms is necessary as well as the possible conse-
quences that flow from their selection. Cremation is defined by the
Oxford English Dictionary as "the action of burning or cremating; the
reduction of a corpse to ashes as a way of disposing of it in lieu of
interment."13 When the body is cremated, nothing but ashes remain.
Therefore, if cremation is elected, the body cannot be reconstituted
later. In addition to controversies that may arise from selecting cre-
mation itself is the question of a final resting place for the ashes them-
selves. Conflict may develop over who will maintain custody of the
ceremonial urn or as to the disposition of the ashes. Next of kin will
sometimes go to great lengths in an attempt to dispose of their loved
ones in a manner they see as fitting, even when there is no opposition
to the method they have selected. One particularly compelling and
emblematic story describes the May 2002 attempts of a woman to scat-
ter her husband's ashes over a baseball field in Seattle. This effort
grabbed headlines across the country by causing the evacuation of the
stadium due to terrorism related fears lingering in the wake of the
September 11 terrorist attacks.
1 4
Burial choices, once made, are often difficult if not impossible to
reverse. If interment is the preferred method, laws in many states
have stringent prohibitions on the exhumation of bodies.1 5 These
laws make interment almost as irreversible as cremation in terms of
long-term ramifications of the choice that can stir controversy. Fur-
thermore, and perhaps more importantly for creation of disputes, the
12 See infra notes 67-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Ted Wil-
liams case and more details on the emerging field of cryogenics. This list is by no
means exhaustive. For example, one may think of Vladimir Lenin's crypt in Red
Square in Moscow. Other examples include the inventor of the Frisbee's remains
being melted into a Frisbee or recent technology that offers the ability to turn the
carbon in a loved one's bones into a gem. See Alternative Death Styles, USA TODAY, Aug.
30, 2002, at 12A.
13 4 OXFORD ENGLISH DiCrioNARY 5 (2d ed. 1989).
14 Cremated Man's Ashes Shut Stadium, Hous. CHRON., May 25, 2002, at A25; see also
John Canzano, She Won't Let Him Miss a Ducks Game, OREGONIAN, Dec. 22, 2002, at C1
(reporting a wife's ongoing, annual efforts to place a small amount of her cremated
husband's ashes on a college football field). For a more amusing perspective, see
MEET THE PARENTS (Universal Studios 2000); THE BIG LEBOWSKI (Gramercy Pictures
1998).
15 See BRENNAN, supra note 11, at 66-74 (providing case annotations and com-
mentary on disinterment and removal).
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method selected impacts the type of funeral service which may be had.
For example, cremations are typically "strictly private," and "no one
except the immediate family" may attend.
16
Cost frequently influences choices made concerning the type of
burial service and can fuel controversy. For example, the "pomp and
circumstance" associated with a conventional in-ground burial is quite
expensive and becoming more so. The funeral industry has seen "the
growth of corporate funeral chains. 1 7 Consequently there are "far
more mortuaries than can be supported full-time by the death rate.
1 8
This excess of supply has caused funeral service providers to engage in
unsavory practices resulting in inflated prices. 19 As the prices of fu-
nerals rise, controversies over payment of the excessive rates are the
likely result. Insufficiency of funds to pay for elaborate, or even sim-
ple, ceremonies may cloud family members' decisions about obeying
the deceased's wishes and fuel confrontations between relatives of the
deceased.
In addition to disputes that may arise as to location and method
of burial, religious issues may create friction amongst decisionmakers
who are planning a funeral. While some religions endorse or en-
courage certain practices, i.e., embalming, other religions discourage
or patently forbid such practices. 20 Not only does religion create is-
sues as to the preparation of the body and the precise method of bur-
ial, it also can cause friction over the performance of types of funeral
ceremonies. One can easily create a number of hypothetical scenarios
that could give rise to this controversy, especially in light of the mod-
ern American trend toward intermarriage, divorce, and remarriage.
2I
It is quite simple to imagine a scenario where the deceased may be
Jewish, the current spouse Catholic, the natural children Buddhist,
and the parents of the deceased Southern Baptist. In such a situation,
16 Id. at 46.
17 See LISA CARLSON, CARING FOR THE DEAD 126-29 (1998). For a historical per-
spective, see BERNARD, supra note 7, at 24 (noting that in 1960 the cost for an average
adult funeral was "about $1,160").
18 CARLSON, supra note 17, at 118.
19 See id. at 167-72.
20 See, e.g., Lott v. State, 225 N.Y.S.2d 434, 435-36 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1962) (noting that
embalming is prohibited by Orthodox Judaism and describing traditional Roman
Catholic burial practices, including adorning the corpse with a crucifix, placing rosary
beads in the hands, and using cosmetics to improve the corpse's appearance).
21 See, e.g., Alberto Bisin et al., Religious Intermarriage and Socialization in the U.S.,
112. J. POL. ECON. (forthcoming 2004) (finding that "[t]he observed intermarriage
and socialization rates are consistent with a strong preference of Protestants,
Catholics, andJews for having children who identify with their own religious beliefs").
2004] 1147
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one or all of the family members may be uncomfortable with the fu-
neral service. The potential for conflict is ripe.
Finally, other micro-level issues may occur during the planning of
a funeral. Scheduling of the funeral, to permit all out of town rela-
tives and friends to attend, may be problematic.22 In addition, minor
issues such as the identity of the eulogizer-or eulogizers-the color/
type of the coffin, selection of pall bearers, and contents of the coffin,
may all emerge as potential sources of conflict for a group of inter-
ested parties.
B. The Organ Donation Problem23
In addition to conflicts that may arise as to manner, location, and
time of burial, issues regarding organ donation continue to be prob-
lematic in the current disposal-of-bodies paradigm. It is frequently
difficult to discern the intent of the deceased, and the wishes of the
family. The "feelings" of the medical profession and the government
often complicate things further. Once again, religious issues may
come into play in this context, as some religions specifically prohibit
organ donation.
24
1. A Brief History of Organ Donation
Prior to 1968, American law lacked a consistent framework for
dealing with the issues of donation of all or part of dead bodies.2 5 In
spite of this lack of a consistent framework, the practice of donating
cadavers for the purpose of medical research enjoys a long and
healthy pedigree. 26 Legal scholars, inspired by the problems created
by the demand for cadavers for medical research, began spilling ink
over the problems of the commoditization of human bodies and their
22 This problem is obviously closely tied in with that mentioned supra note 10: the
statutory pressure to bury the dead in a specific period. In addition, scheduling of the
funeral may further implicate religious issues, such as the Jewish requirement that the
dead be buried "before sunset following the death." MAURICE LAMM, THEJEwiSH WAY
IN DEATH AND MOURNING 22-33 (2000)
23 Again, an aside about what this Note will not discuss. In considering organ
donation and the donation of cadavers, I have intentionally avoided any discussion of
the controversy surrounding medical research conducted using fetal tissue, i.e., stem
cell research.
24 For example, the Jewish religion has a general prohibition against organ dona-
tion. See LAMM, supra note 22, at 6-9.
25 BERNARD, supra note 7, at 55.
26 See generally RUTH RICHARDSON, DEATH, DISSECTION AND THE DESTITUTE 30-51
(2d ed. 2000) (describing the historical evolution of "clinical detachment.., both in
the lives of individual clinicians and .. .the history of medicine"). Id. at 31.
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donation as early as 1885.27 Since that time, the controversy over in-
creased demand for organs and tissue material has only grown. Con-
flicts have emerged-both legally and medically-particularly with the
development of advanced medical technologies permitting the trans-
plantation of many different organs ranging from eyes to hearts. 2
However, in spite of the growing demand for post-death human tissue,
the law prior to 1968 had been slow to develop a coherent system for
organ donation dispute resolution. Currently, the American legal sys-
tem may have a method of dispute resolution for these disputes. Yet,
this method is not adequately prepared to meet the changing land-
scape of medical technologies. The current system is also ill equipped
to resolve the conflicts between next of kin that emerge, or may
emerge, as technology advances.
In America, there have been some attempts at creating a coher-
ent legal framework for the organ donation problem. However, the
underdevelopment of the law of donation of bodies is a continuing
problem without an easy solution, and the overarching theme of this
Note, the disposition of dead bodies generally, reflects this systematic
failure to deal with these problems. Commoditization-or lack
thereof-and finding a consistent legal identity for dead bodies has
been problematic since the time of the great English jurist Sir Edward
Coke.29 This is primarily because the legal system, and more impor-
tantly those who design and maintain it, disdains conceptualizing bod-
ies as "property."30 In spite of the law's distaste for treating corpses as
property, an increasing need for a cogent body of law to respond to
this problem demanded a response. That response, in America, came
in the form of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA). The Ameri-
can Bar Association approved the UAGA in 1968, and by 1971, it had
been adopted in some form by all fifty states and the District of Co-
27 Francis King Carey, The Disposition of the Body After Death, 19 AM. L. REv. 251,
252 (1885) (noting that "the subject [of corpses] (both popularly and technically) has
become one of the great problems of the age").
28 See, e.g., R. Alta Charo, Skin and Bones: Post-Mortem Markets in Human Tissue, 26
NovA L. REv. 421, 422-23 (2002) (describing the "history of using various human
non-organ tissues, whether obtained from living or deceased donors, so that the issues
surrounding postmortem markets in bone, skin, and other tissues can be better situ-
ated within the context of the American market and regulation for tissue generally");
William Boulier, Note, Sperm, Spleens, and Other Valuables: The Need to Recognize Property
Rights in Human Body Parts, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 693, 693-94 (1995) (noting that as a
result of technological advancements, "human body parts have taken on a new value
above and beyond any sentimental, dignitary, or elemental value").
29 BERNARD, supra note 7, at 16.
30 Id.
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lumbia. 31 The adoption of the UAGA by the several states has greatly
clarified the law of organ donation and has added a much needed
degree of uniformity to the process. However, questions and legal dis-
putes over organ donation persist and will continue to persist as the
demand for organs grows along with America's aging population.3 2
2. Modern Disputes and the Problem of Organ Donation
While a great deal of case law on the subject highlights how fre-
quently organ donation causes disputes, many of these cases are state
interpretations of state law. These cases also illustrate how disputes
frequently use litigation as a resolution mechanism. While many
states adopted the UAGA, modification was typical prior to accept-
ance.3 3 This amendment process means that the laws governing dona-
tion of organic tissue are heavily state-dependent and thus vary
significantly in their application from state to state. Indeed, the fed-
eral government has made a foray into the issue of organ donation,
but this legislation consists primarily of statutes authorizing federal
funding of organ or tissue banks and facilitation of their operation.3 4
It is useful at this point to discuss some modern organ donation
cases and hypothetical situations that could emerge. The majority of
existing cases deal with issues of improper action by medical person-
nel in either removing organs without permission or confusing the
identities of patients. 35 These disputes, while not dealing directly with
controversies among family members, suggest how problems may
arise. In contrast, one could suppose a hypothetical situation where a
minor child signs an organ donation form while obtaining her driver's
31 Id.
32 See generally U.S. CENSUS BuREAu, supra note 6, at 15 (projecting resident popu-
lation by sex and age from 2005 to 2050).
33 See Charo, supra note 28, at 429-31.
34 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 273, 274-274e (2000).
35 See, e.g., Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding
that a county coroner's office is bound by due process to consult the medical records
of the deceased prior to removing corneas); Jacobsen v. Matin Gen. Hosp., 963 F.
Supp. 866, 873-74 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that the California UAGA provides that
when a search for next of kin is unsuccessful, the corpse may be released to facilitate
the underlying purposes of the Act); Perry v. St. Francis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 886 F.
Supp. 1551, 1558 (D. Kan. 1995) (holding that a consent form signed by the de-
ceased's family members is not an enforceable contract); Lyon v. United States, 843 F.
Supp. 531, 536 (D. Minn. 1994) (holding that a hospital acted in good faith in har-
vesting corneas from a patient whose family had mistakenly signed an "eye donor"
card, and therefore the hospital was immune from liability).
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license. 36 The parents, whom the UAGA considers the next of kin,
are not aware of this action. The child is tragically killed in a car acci-
dent and the hospital wants to act based on the driver's license con-
sent to harvest the organs. This would seem to be a dispute ripe for
resolution. Traditional models suggest that a courtroom is the proper
forum to resolve this problem.3 7 The difficult question to ascertain
here is: Whose wishes should be followed? Should a decisionmaker
follow the desires of the deceased minor, or the parents? Alterna-
tively, and perhaps more novel-and unique to this Note as a hypo-
thetical-would be a situation where there was no clear intent to
donate evidenced by the deceased. However, one parent wants to do-
nate the organs and the other does not. An immeasurable number of
hypothetical conflict situations could arise.
C. The Interested Parties Problem
In resolving any dispute, it is important to consider the identities
of the parties to the dispute. For example, two corporations "feel"
very differently about the outcome of disputes than do two individu-
als. They may be willing, or able, to invest more resources in the out-
come. Individuals may have a greater need for closure than do
corporations. In considering current systems and proposing alterna-
tives to any dispute resolution device, it is essential to consider the
nature of those involved in the situation.
The identity of the parties who are interested in burial controver-
sies has serious weight. When evaluating the current dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms or considering potential alternatives, it is essential to
remember the disputants. Burial disputes create a unique confluence
of factors suggesting that ADR is the best-suited mechanism to resolve
the dispute. Family members and next of kin are the key parties con-
36 Many states include on their driver's license forms the ability to enroll in the
state's organ donation program. However, these indications are oftentimes not bind-
ing on the donee absent consent from the next of kin. There has been a movement
afoot to reverse this presumption. See Patricia Lopez, Rep. Luther to Propose National
Organ Donation Bill, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis/St. Paul),July 9, 2002, at 5A (comment-
ing on a Minnesota law that made a driver's license organ donation preference bind-
ing, and a nationwide effort to create a similar program); see also MINN. STAT. § 171.06
(2003) (creating the Minnesota Driver License Organ Donor Program); Josephine
Marcotty, Making the Wish of an Organ Donor into a Promise, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis/
St. Paul), Mar. 9, 2002, at IA (reporting that the "trend shows how organ-procure-
ment organizations across the country are becoming more assertive as the demands
for life-saving organs continue to rise while the number of donors stays fairly
constant").
37 In fact, this is the resolution mechanism prescribed by the UAGA in most
states.
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cerned. Of course, they will be interested in the arrangements, but
some parties may have more interest than others. Parents may be
more interested in the interment arrangements for their children
than will be siblings. In addition, spouses may want to have more in-
put than children or other family members. Typically, many jurisdic-
tions arrange their laws to respect this ordering of interest.38 In spite
of there being some degree of legal certainty over who has control
over the actual disposition of the body, that does not mean this order-
ing is the best way to resolve these disputes. Furthermore, the rules
vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
39
The law may have its own hierarchy and method of identifying
interested parties. However, this system does not necessarily account
for all of the parties who may be involved in a dispute over disposition
of the body. One of the key parties, especially in the organ donation
context, is the state. This interested party expresses its role through
the many state statutes that set up a comprehensive organ donation
network and support citizen awareness programs to encourage enroll-
ment in organ donation programs.40
Additionally, religious organizations may have an interest in how
these disputes are resolved. Certain religious organizations have views
regarding the desecration of bodies and their proper interment. An-
other potential party to consider is the interest of burial or funeral
arranging organizations. They may exert lobbying influence on a
state to insure certain default mechanisms in burial proceedings. Fu-
neral organizations may also pressure the other interested parties to
have them choose a particular method of burial because of an inher-
ent self-interest. From the moment a family arrives at a funeral home,
the funeral director is doing a "mental calculation of your income" in
order to maximize his profit.41 Certainly, the funeral directors have
an interest in how disputes over disposal of dead bodies are resolved.
These hypothetical interested parties are suggested to illustrate
that, in order to resolve burial disputes, resolution mechanisms ideally
would be able to take into account the interests of all of the interested
parties-from the state to the deceased's pets, like Ted Williams's dog
38 SeeJAcKSON, supra note 10, at 41-55; see also CARLSON, supra note 17, at 55-56
(cataloging various states' next of kin rules for control over estates and other post-
death interests).
39 CARLSON, supra note 17, at 55-56.
40 See, e.g., Joanna E. Scannell, Funeral Arrangements and Organ Donations, in
DRAFTING WILLS AND TRUSTS IN MASSACHUSETTS § 3.5 (2002) (describing a number of
organizations that are involved in facilitating organ donation).
41 CARLSON, supra note 17, at 119.
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"Slugger."42 I suggest that the current system is ill equipped to meet
the many demands of all of the interested parties.
II. TRADITIONAL METHODS FOR RESOLVING DISPUTES
A. The Adversarial System: A Perspective and History
One of the main arguments of this Note is that the failure on
Americans' parts to consider nonadversarial or alternative dispute res-
olution mechanisms is partially responsible for the "litigation explo-
sion" that has plagued and clogged our justice system. Since
America's founding, adversarial processes have formed the basis for
our resolution of conflicts. Even in its genesis, America was a nation
forged from the fire of direct confrontation, the Revolutionary War,
and America remains "a nation of fighters, with a tradition of every
man-and sometimes woman-for himself."43 The explanations for
America's confrontational, individualistic culture are as diverse and
numerous as the nation's population itself. 44 Yet discussion of these
explanations lies beyond the scope of this Note. Instead, I wish to
focus on how this confrontational culture has manifested itself in the
American model of dispute resolution through what is frequently de-
scribed as the "litigation explosion" of the past quarter century. How
does our confrontational culture express itself when it comes to dis-
putes over the burial of members of our society? What devices does
the legal system currently use to resolve those disputes?
Americans historically and presently have expressed a dislike for
lawyers. 45 However, since the time of our founding we have been,
ironically, a litigious society. De Tocqueville chronicled our nation's
obsession with the law from its early history when he wrote that
"[s] carcely any political question arises in the United States that is not
resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question." 46 The simplest ex-
planation for this phenomenon is the American belief in a govern-
ment of laws and not of men. Our constitution entrusts the role of
42 "Ted told me several times that he wanted to be cremated and have his ashes,
and the ashes of his dog Slugger, spread off the Florida Keys." Mishra, supra note 2
(quoting Williams's longtime friend and business partner, Arthur "Buzz" Hamon).
43 LINDA R. SINGER, SETTLING DISPUTES 1 (2d ed. 1994).
44 See, e.g.,JOHN W. KINGDON, AMERICA THE UNUSUAL 26-32 (1999). "This individ-
ualism is closely connected to the much-noticed tendency of Americans to prize lib-
erty or freedom, that is, liberty or freedom for autonomous individuals." Id. at 26.
45 See SINGER, supra note 43, at 1-2 (noting that "[e]arly Americans distrusted
lawyers" and commenting on the early constitution of South Carolina that criticized
lawyers).
46 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (Phillips Bradley ed.,
Henry Reeve. trans., 1953) (1835).
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applying and interpreting the law in a uniform manner to the judici-
ary.4 7 Therefore, all questions of law wind up in court, and through
inheritance of the English legal system, the judicial system in America
is an adversarial one. Ordered conflict discovers the truth; the opera-
tion of "saying what the law is" involves conflict between parties to
arrive at a just result.
48
B. Litigation and Adjudication-The Default Route
As with most disputes in the United States, serious controversies
arising out of the burial of bodies are primarily resolved through liti-
gation. As one treatise author has noted, "[t]he traditional legal re-
sponse to a dispute between parties has been for a lawyer for one of
the parties to initiate the litigation process .... "-49 Black's Law Diction-
ary defines "litigation" as a " [c] ontest in a court of law for the purpose
of enforcing a right or seeking a remedy."50 Litigation, for purposes
of this Note, means a standard lawsuit between two parties, with a
plaintiff and a defendant, filed in a court of law. I say filed in a court
of law as opposed to resolved in a court because most disputes that
become lawsuits do not actually go to trial.51 On the contrary,
treasures trove of scholarly inquiry and statistical studies and analyses
have demonstrated that the "vast majority of cases are settled" before
reaching the trial stage. 52 Furthermore, many disputes between par-
ties will not be "serious" enough for the parties to actually retain a
lawyer and commence a lawsuit.5 3 For example, if one is "stood up"
by a blind date there will undoubtedly be some "dispute" between the
jilted suitor and the woman who has elected to forgo their date. How-
47 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
48 See Robert GilbertJohnston & Sara Lufrano, The Adversary System as a Means of
Seeking Truth and Justice, 35J. MARSHALL L. REV. 147, 147 (2002). "'The purpose of a
lawsuit is to arrive at the truth of the controversy, in order that justice may be done.'"
Id. (quoting Edward F. Barrett, The Adversary System and the Ethics of Advocacy, 37
NOTRE DAME LAW. 479, 479 (1962)).
49 JACQUELINE M. NoLAN-HALEv, ALTERNATIVE DisPUTE RESOLUTION 1 (1992).
50 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 934 (6th ed. 1990).
51 See, e.g., D.A. WATERMAN & MARK A. PETERSON, MODELS OF LEGAL DECISIONMAK-
ING 1 (1981).
52 Id.
53 See, e.g., William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Dis-
putes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming.... 15 LAw & Soc'v REV. 631, 632 (1981) (providing
"a framework within which the emergence and transformation of disputes can be de-
scribed"); Richard E. Miller, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes, 15 LAw & Soc'v REv. 525,
525 (1981) (noting that the origin, development, and rate of transformation of
problems into disputes are "questions ... rarely addressed").
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ever, societal conventions and a reasonable cost-benefit analysis, in-
formed by the likelihood that the erstwhile Romeo will not obtain
relief in a court, all counsel strongly against this dispute becoming a
lawsuit. The blind date hypothetical is but one of millions of disputes
that arise every day that could not and do not become lawsuits. Yet,
there are still thousands of lawsuits filed every day in courts across this
country, concerning disputes ranging from the enormous-multi-bil-
lion dollar tobacco litigation-to the miniscule-a minor car crash
between two college students.
54
Academics and jurists alike, researching for over thirty years, have
extensively documented and debated the phenomenon in America of
increasing numbers of lawsuits known as the "litigation explosion." 55
The perception of a litigation explosion is a surprisingly modern de-
velopment. As recently as 1960, commentators, including prominent
judges, remarked about a decline in litigation in America, rather than
a rise.56 Yet, the American public, academics, and government have
all been concerned in recent years with the problem of the litigation
explosion. It is widely perceived that the use of lawsuits to resolve
disputes in America has become far too pervasive. Consequently, liti-
gants pack courts and the dockets of our public servant judges figura-
tively overflow. In spite of the forceful assertions of many regarding
the extent of the growth of lawsuits, some writers have argued that the
problem is not as serious as the masses .contend.57 The inescapable
fact remains that the litigation explosion, perceived or otherwise, has
ground the traditional model of dispute resolution in American soci-
ety to a near halt.
It is useful at this stage to describe, in slightly greater detail, how
the adjudication process works. Most of this process is common
knowledge to any lawyer who has taken a first year Civil Procedure
54 For a further discussion on the so-called litigation explosion and the difficul-
ties in determining precisely how many lawsuits are filed in the United States every
year, see generally Samuel Jan Brakel, Using What We Know About Our Civil Litigation
System: A Critique of "Base-Rate "Analysis and Other Apologist Diversions, 31 GA. L. REv. 77
(1996).
55 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Roles of Litigation, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 705, 706
(2002) (noting that "[e]mpirical studies that debunk claims about various aspects of
the U.S. litigation landscape have been available for decades"); Marc Galanter, The
Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REv. 3, 5 (1986) (examining "several aspects
of the current discourse about litigation: the assumption that Americans are exces-
sively litigious; the belief that this is displayed in skyrocketing court caseloads; and the
tendency to see the costs but not the benefits of litigation").
56 See, e.g., Charles D. Breitel, The Quandary in Litigation, 25 Mo. L. REv. 225, 225
(1960) (commenting that "it is also true that there is a decline in litigation").
57 See Galanter, supra note 55 passim.
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class; however, a quick review will be useful to compare the features of
adjudication with those used in alternative models. In the U.S. federal
district courts and most state courts, a lawsuit is initiated through a
process known as "notice pleading. '58 This system was designed to
replace what was seen as the overwhelmingly complicated and cum-
bersome process that had preceded it: code pleading.59 One of the
main objectives of the notice pleading system is that technical defi-
ciencies should not deny a meritorious claim its day in court. Rule 8
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which establishes a very low
bar for a complaint to clear in order to become a lawsuit, is the pri-
mary facilitator of this objective. 60 Rule 8 only requires a "short and
plain statement of the facts and the law on which relief is to be
granted."6 1 The Supreme Court has repeatedly rebuffed attempts by
lower courts to utilize "heightened pleading" as a way of raising the
barrier of entry.62 Instead, the current rules provide that nonmerito-
rious but technically sound claims should be dismissed through exten-
sive, and quite frequently expensive, pretrial processes such as
discovery and subsequent summary judgment. While this system has
proven relatively effective at "resolving disputes," as fewer than five
percent of claims filed reach trial,63 it is not without many problems.
If a disputant has the resources and patience to see her claim
through to trial, the dispute resolution mechanism utilized therein is
very formal. Extensive sets of rules govern trials, and they are pre-
sided over by a neutral third party provided by the government. With
the exception of the small cost of filing fees, the actual trial itself does
not cost the disputants at all. The decisionmaker is most frequently a
judge, although many civil cases in America also use a jury. When a
jury is involved, their role is limited to deciding questions of fact.
With the exception of the ability to appeal, which is very time and
dollar consuming, decisions made by the court are final and binding
on the parties involved.
When all the process concludes, resolving disputes through resort
to traditional government provided dispute resolution mechanisms
can take many years. If appealed to the highest level, it could take as
58 See RICHARD D. FREER & WENDY COLLINS PERDUE, CIVIL PROCEDURE 301-36 (3d
ed. 2001).
59 Id.
60 FED. R. Cry. P. 8.
61 Id.
62 See, e.g., Leatherman v. Tarrant County, 507 U.S. 163 (1993); see also
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002) (holding that an employment
discrimination plaintiff "need not plead a prima facie case of discrimination").
63 Galanter, supra note 55, at 8.
BURYING THE HATCHET
long as five to ten years to resolve the conflict. In addition, the pro-
cess requires extensive use of lawyers, experts, consultants and other
technicians, although taxpayers provide the services of the judge and
jury free of cost to the disputants. The costs that can accumulate to a
defendant, even if ultimately victorious, are enormous. As many
plaintiffs' attorneys operate on a contingent fee basis, the initial direct
costs to plaintiffs are not quite as large. However, the time consump-
tion remains the same and the standard thirty percent contingent
fee 64 is not exactly "small potatoes."
C. Examples of the Traditional Method: The Cases
It is, perhaps, insurmountably difficult to accurately describe how
burial disputes are dealt with in specific particularity. This is primarily
because the rules that govern decisions in these disputes are normally
generated either through state court-made common law or state stat-
utes, but the content of the law itself varies tremendously from state to
state. Therefore, when describing the contemporary methods of bur-
ial dispute resolution, it is of course necessary to issue the caveat that
these mechanisms differ markedly from state to state in the specifics
of their application. However, I attempt to draw a rough outline of
what happens when "brother" and "sister" get into an argument over
how to bury "dad" properly. As a primary guide, we have several cases,
beginning with the high profile Ted Williams case described below,65
to outline the contours of how these disputes are resolved. To com-
mence, I introduce a more general guideline as to how litigation
works.
In the typical burial dispute situation, one needs several "ingredi-
ents." First, there is an obvious need for a deceased person. However,
that alone is not enough, for the dispute also needs an additional in-
terested party to contest some aspect of the burial method. In this
situation, the aggrieved person will institute a lawsuit in a state or fed-
eral court to contest the will in a probate proceeding, or they will
institute a common law action for some other transgression, such as
mishandling of a dead body or conversion. The two parties then ei-
ther negotiate a settlement or they proceed through the normal
64 "(A) contingent fee of one-third of the amount recovered has become a gen-
eral standard, at least in personal injury actions." I ROBERT L. Rossi, ATToRNEY's FEES
§ 2:9, at 112-13 (2d ed. 1995).
65 See infra notes 67-86 and accompanying text.
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hoops6 6 until either they provide themselves with a resolution or the
judicial system provides one for them in the form of a court order.
There are many, many possible permutations to this basic scenario,
however, and in the following subsections, I explore several cases to
demonstrate how these scenarios play out in the traditional dispute
resolution process.
In general, I categorize burial disputes into three groups, each
with its own special characteristics entering into the calculus of their
appropriateness for alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. First
are disputes that erupt prior to the interment of the body of the de-
ceased. A time crunch, due to natural human desire and the common
law requirement of a "Christian burial," acts to accelerate the dispute.
Therefore, in evaluating contemporary methods I will place special
emphasis on the speed of the process.
Second is a category of disputes that focus on bodies that have
already been interred. Here there is little absolute need to resolve the
dispute quickly. However, additional concerns, such as the sanctity of
a "final resting" place enter into the picture. In addition, problems of
state concern, such as sanitation and health issues, emerge, as do the
interests of multiple parties.
Finally, I will consider disputes that arise when families disagree
about the donation of the deceased's organs. This area is a special
subset of the pre-burial disputes mentioned above, so many of the
same issues pertain. Here the time crunch issue is perhaps even more
relevant and the irreversibility problem is exacerbated. Additionally,
the state's interest, which manifests the public's interest generally, is
increased because of the demand for a supply of viable organs for
donation.
Throughout all of these disputes, the issues of money and costs
are also present. It is expensive to bury someone in the first place. As
described above, every minute the dispute drags on increases the costs
to the disputants. Furthermore, in this context, it is unlikely that ei-
ther side is being represented on a contingent fee basis because the
recovery will normally be in the form of control, not money.
1. Before Burial Disputes
While it is certain that there are many disputes that erupt after
death but prior to burial, there is a paucity of reported cases dealing
with this issue. One of the high profile cases was that of baseball great
66 The normal hoops would consist of summary judgment, discovery, and the
other "filtering devices" provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See supra
Part I.B.
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Ted Williams, the "Splendid Splinter." The sordid affair that erupted
after his death, as his daughter publicly fought her brother for control
of her father's burial, largely provided the genesis for this Note.
By way of introduction, for the woeful among us who do not en-
joy baseball or its history, here is a small sketch of who Ted Williams
was. Mr. Williams is often quoted as having said that when he walked
down the street, he wanted people to say, "[t]here goes Ted Williams,
the greatest hitter who ever lived." 67 By the time of his death, Ted
Williams had certainly accomplished that goal. The last player in Ma-
jor League Baseball to have hit for a .400 average in a season, 68 Wil-
liams was acknowledged by Major League Baseball, prior to his death,
as the "greatest living ballplayer." 69 In addition to his outstanding
baseball achievements, Williams also abandoned his career twice to
serve his country in both World War II and the Korean conflict as a
fighter pilot with the U.S. Marine Corps. Finally, Ted Williams was a
world-record-holding fly angler, remaining active in the sport until
shortly before he passed away.
Ted Williams was a living legend to millions of American baseball
fans and his passing on July 5, 2002 was greeted with shock and
mourning across the country and the world. 70 Former presidents eu-
logized the man as "demonstrat[ing] unique talent and love of coun-
try. "71 Yet, for all of his accomplishments in life, the last chapter of his
legacy, written after his death, would play itself out in full view of the
American public as his children engaged in a furious debate over his
final resting place.
The dispute over Williams's body first became public a few days
after his death72 and was not fully "resolved" until late December. 73
The core of the dispute was simple enough: Ted Williams's son, John
Henry Williams claimed that his father's preferred method of inter-
67 TED WILLIAMS, My TURN AT BAT 7 (1969).
68 BILL JAMES, BASEBALL STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 382-83, 582 (2002). Williams ac-
complished this legendary feat in 1941, going six for eight on the last day of the
regular season to raise his average from .3995 to .406. Id.
69 MLB.com, A Tribute to Ted Williams, at http://mlb.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/
mlb/news/tributes/mlb obit tedwilliams.jsp (last visited Feb. 11, 2004).
70 See, e.g., William Gildea, 'The Greatest Hitter Ever, 'WASH. POST, July 6, 2002, at
DI; Peter Schmuck, Baseball Hall of Fame Hitter Dead at 83, BALT. SUN, July 6, 2002, at
IA; Sporting Digest-Baseball, INDEPENDENT (London), July 6, 2002, at 9; George F.
Will, An Alloy of Innocence, Arrogance, PLAiN DEALER (Cleveland), July 6, 2002, at B8.
71 Gildea, supra note 70 (quoting former President George H.W. Bush).
72 See, e.g., Peter Finney, Slugger's Son Has Cold Heart, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orle-
ans), July 14, 2002, at Al.
73 See Mishra, supra note 2.
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ment was to be cryogenically frozen.7 4 The Splinter's daughter, Bar-
baraJoyce (Bobby-Jo) Williams Ferrell believed Williams desired to be
cremated and "sued for Williams's cremation. '75 John Henry claimed
to have proof of his father's wishes, as evidenced by a pact from the
year 2000 scrawled on an "oil-stained paper scrap."7 6 Bobby-Jo's claim
was based on the text of Williams's 1996 will, which specified that he
should be cremated and have his ashes scattered in the Atlantic
Ocean off the Florida coast.
77
What was initially an intra-family dispute quickly found itself in a
Florida courtroom. Bobby-Jo filed suit contesting the interment of
Ted Williams-" [i] mmersed in liquid nitrogen .. .being frozen"-as
contrary to his will. 78 Shortly thereafter, on July 16, 2002, Williams's
will was filed in court, with its executor, Albert Cassidy, agreeing with
the validity of John Henry's handwritten cryogenic agreement.79 The
saga continued over the next several months with attempts at reaching
a negotiated agreement proceeding and then stalling and then pro-
ceeding again. It is important, for this Note's purposes, to briefly ob-
serve that the disputants had to request permission from the court to
reach a private settlement.8 0 As the months dragged on, Bobby-Jo's
legal expenses mounted and she made an appeal to the public to help
her finance the growing cost of challenging the method of disposal of
her father's body.81 By early August, the dispute had already cost Mrs.
Ferrell "$30,000 to $40,000 ... and [that was] just starting."8 2 Tell-
ingly, Bobby-Jo's own attorney commented on these types of disputes:
"It's unfortunate, but it's the nature of the beast.
8 3
With the estate's executor supporting John Henry, Mrs. Ferrell's
legal claims were close to exhaustion as August ended.8 4 In spite of
this, she filed a new suit, challenging the Florida court's jurisdiction
74 Franci Richardson, Talks Heat Up Over Frozen Ted, BOSTON HERALD, Nov. 6,
2002, at 031.
75 Id.
76 Mishra, supra note 2.
77 Williams'Daughter Drops Objections to Cryonic Storage, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2002, at
D10.
78 Finney, supra note 72.
79 Jeffrey Bair, Sports Notebook, Hous. CHRON., July 17, 2002, at 10.
80 See No Settlement Reached in Ted Williams Dispute, CHI. SuN-TIMES,July 24, 2002, at
46.
81 Franci Richardson, Slugger's Daughter Makes Public Cash Appeal, BOSTON HERALD,
Aug. 6, 2002, at 12.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Raja Mishra, Ted Williams Estate Backs Plan to Freeze Remains, PiTr. POsT-GA-
ZETrE, Aug. 14, 2002, at S2.
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because the body was in Arizona. This new suit merely spurred more
negotiations, which eventually culminated in the court supervised
agreement entered into in December.8 5 In the end, Ferrell relented
in her pursuit of her father's last wishes primarily because of the ex-
pense of the matter. "The financial cost of my struggle would be ex-
traordinary and would result in significant difficulties for my family,"
Ferrell said in a statement after the settlement of her case.8 6
The Williams case is a perfect example of the potential disputes
that may emerge following the death of a loved one in our society.
The cost to one side was described in the tens of thousands of dollars.
The dispute was not finally resolved until almost half a year after it
had begun. It is also important to note that the court was not
equipped, as a dispute resolution mechanism, to have prevented John
Henry Williams from "interring" Ted Williams in the manner of his
choosing, in spite of Bobby-Jo's initial objections. Had the scenario
been reversed, a negotiated settlement would have been very difficult
to accomplish. How is one to un-cremate the deceased's body?
Another dispute that was resolved using adjudication was that of
Enos v. Snyder,8 7 a case from the early twentieth century in California.
An analysis of that case illustrates that many of the weaknesses that
plagued the traditional model of dispute resolution in the Ted Wil-
liams case have a long pedigree.
In 1898,John Enos died in Sonoma County.8 8 Mr. Enos had lived
a racy life by nineteenth century standards. He had been living "[f] or
several years... before his death" not with his wife, but with the de-
fendant in the case, Rachel Jane Snyder.8 9 Before he expired, Mr.
Enos drafted a will directing that his burial should be conducted "ac-
cording to the wishes and directions of Mrs. R.J. Snyder."90 Mrs. Sny-
der was only too happy to comply with Mr. Enos's will, but, his wife
and daughter objected to this provision of his will and "made demand
of defendant Snyder for possession of his body for the purpose of bur-
ying the same."91 When Mrs. Snyder refused the Enos' demands, Mrs.
85 See, e.g., Mishra, supra note 2; Raja Mishra, Williams Family in Talks to End Feud,
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 12, 2002, at B2; Richardson, supra note 81; Mike Schneider,
Williams' Heirs Each to Receive $215,000, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 20, 2002, at B5.
86 Williams' Daughter Drops Objections to Cryonic Storage, supra note 77.
87 63 P. 170 (Cal. 1900).
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Enos sought to resolve the dispute using the mechanism most Ameri-
cans would look to first:92 she sued.
The lower court entered a judgment for the plaintiffs and the
defendant appealed to the California Supreme Court. 93 The court
then looked at legal precedent and statutory law and decided that,
regardless of the stated will of the deceased, the right of burial be-
longed to the wife or next of kin.
94
The essential facts of this case, for present purposes, are that
John Enos died on March 30, 1898.95 Yet, the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia did not enter final judgment until December 21, 1900.96 Fur-
ther prolonging the resolution of this dispute, a petition for rehearing
was not denied untilJanuary 19, 1901. 9 7 It took the traditional model
of dispute resolution almost three full years to settle a dispute between
two parties who both sought the same goal-to see John Enos laid to
rest. In addition, we can have no idea of the costs involved in this
case, although one can assume that it was no less expensive in 1900 to
appeal a case to a state supreme court than it is now.
2. After Burial Disputes
I will analyze several cases which deal with disputes that arise after
the deceased has been interred for some time. In this context, there
are different special interests represented-namely society's ex-
pressed desire to permit one a final resting place and its general dis-
taste for exhumation of bodies. The cases will illustrate how courts
grapple with these issues and subsequently resolve them.
First is a 1921 case from the Supreme Court of New Hampshire,
Lavigne v. Wilkinson.98 This case offers only a brief introduction into
how courts deal with burial disputes post-interment. In the reported
versions of the case, which come from the appellate court and not the
trial court, the final outcome of the dispute is not indicated. How-
ever, rules of decision for disputes over interred bodies are, in some
respects, announced. 99
92 This, I am sure, was particularly true at the turn of the century. I find it diffi-
cult to believe that the concept of the multi-door courthouse had gathered much
speed in 1898. See infra Part III.A.
93 Enos, 63 P. at 171.
94 Id. at 171-72.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 170.
98 116 A. 32 (N.H. 1921).




George Lavigne sued his daughter, Eva Wilkinson, in equity to
obtain permission for the removal of the remains of his wife from
their place of original interment. 00 His daughter fought this request,
primarily because Mr. Lavigne remarried after his wife's passing. The
trial court dismissed Mr. Lavigne's suit, "based upon the finding that
the plaintiff freely consented to the burial of his wife . . . with the
intention and understanding that it should be her final resting
place."' 0
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the trial court's
dismissal and remanded the case for reconsideration with instructions
for the court to "seek to find what ought to be done under all the
circumstances."' 0 2 The court analyzed many prior precedents and
found that, although the bodies of the deceased are not property in
the conventional sense, the next of kin retain rights in their loved
one's proper interment. The court stated that these rights could be
"best determined and administered by the rule of reasonableness"' 0 3
and went on to note that this rule was justified because
there is nothing that touches more intimately the feelings and sensi-
bilities of people than controversies relating to the disposal and
control of the remains of their dead. And such methods should be
adopted in dealing with these unfortunate disputes as are best cal-
culated to reach just and equitable results, and to inflict the least
trouble and distress upon the parties.
10 4
Justice Plummer then went on to state that, to obtain disinter-
ment and removal, a party must demonstrate "strong and convincing
evidence showing that it would be unreasonable to refuse" to allow
the disinterment.10 5 This language seems to open the door for a long
and searching trial to determine whether it is reasonable to move the
deceased. While the desirability of a legal rule that permits flexibility
goes without stating, the method suggested by this opinion highlights
some of the difficulties associated with the traditional model. The
main difficulty that comes to mind is cost. If a deceased's next of kin
objects to an attempt by another relative to disinter the remains of the
deceased, this ruling would seem to imply that they must go to court
and fight off the efforts of their other family member. The realm of
evidence that a New Hampshire court, following this ruling, would
100 Id. at 32.
101 Id.
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have to consider would in all likelihood be voluminous. However, it
seems obvious that a case like this may well not at all be about the
deceased's wishes. In fact, if the case developed like Lavigne, collat-
eral issues may predominate, such as a child's disapproval of their new
step-parent. Courts appear ill equipped to deal with such a compli-
cated case and resolve the true core of the dispute.
A second, more modern case that demonstrates how courts at-
tempt to resolve post-burial disputes is Tully v. Pate.10 6 This is an ex-
cellent case for purposes of this Note because it demonstrates the
inability of courts to resolve the "real" issues that often underlie dis-
putes regarding burial arrangements. Tully also illustrates well the
snail's pace at which adjudications of these claims proceed.
In Tully v. Pate, Mr. Tully sued the sister of his estranged wife and
alleged that she interfered with his burial rights in his children and
his attendance at their funeral. 10 7 The facts of the case are compli-
cated and distorted, and paint the picture of a bitter divorce and cus-
tody struggle between Mr. Tully, his wife, and his wife's family-a
struggle that unfortunately included a burial dispute due to the tragic
death of his two children in a fire.108 Following the death of his chil-
dren, who were the subject of a then unresolved custody battle, Mr.
Tully unsuccessfully sought a restraining order to prevent Mrs. Pate
and his estranged and severely injured wife from interring his chil-
dren.10 9 Meanwhile, the Tully divorce case, involving the issues of
burial and custody of the children, wound its way to the Georgia Su-
preme Court, where it was decided in favor of Mrs. Tully. 1 0
Tully v. Pate, as the district court judge who decided it aptly con-
cluded, was "essentially a fight between an estranged husband and his
sister-in-law," and it "shock[ed] the sensibilities of [the] court.""'
Judge Hemphill thought that "the forum is being used for vindictive
pursuit rather than a place where justice is sought."112 In spite of
these suspicions, the court's first opportunity to dispose of the entire
case, which it could not do, did not present itself until almost a full
106 372 F. Supp. 1064 (D.S.C. 1973).
107 Id. at 1066.
108 Id. at 1065-71.
109 Id. at 1068-69.
110 Id. at 1070; see also Tully v. Tully, 177 S.E.2d 49 (Ga. 1970) (affirming the lower
court's decision in the earlier divorce and custody battle between the two Tully
parents).
111 Tully, 372 F. Supp. at 1065-66.
112 Id. at 1066.
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year after it had been filed. 113 In addition, the core issues of this
case-specifically the inability of Mr. and Mrs. Tully to get along-
could not be effectively dealt with by the court. Adjudication was also
unsuccessful in stopping the burial or in enabling Mr. Tully to attend
the funeral of his own children. Once again, one can only speculate
at the cost involved in bringing this case to the Supreme Court of
Georgia and then raising it again in federal district court.
3. Organ Donation Disputes
The final types of disputes concerning the death of a loved one
that this Note evaluates are controversies developing out of organ do-
nation decisions. The issues surrounding these disputes have been
raised above. 1 14 I now examine two cases that illustrate how courts
have confronted these issues utilizing traditional dispute resolution
techniques. In these cases, one again observes how ill suited courts
are for resolving the primary issues at stake in burial disputes.
Two cases with relatively similar fact patterns demonstrate well
the failure of courts to adequately deal with organ donation disputes.
Whaley v. County of Saginaw'15 and Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran1 16 both
concerned suits by discontented next of kin against government offi-
cials for damages after their loved ones' organs were removed without
their permission. In both cases, the courts found for the plaintiffs and
awarded damages of some type. While these cases deal more with dis-
crete issues of law, they illustrate that disputes between interested par-
ties can easily develop when organ donation is at issue. The statutes
make it relatively clear how states should act in seeking donors, how-
ever at times either those statutes are not entirely clear or their dic-
tates are ignored. When mistakes are made, the only possible
recourse for the injured parties is expensive and time-consuming liti-
gation, with the possible award of damages as the fleeting pot of gold
at the end of the rainbow.
An additional scenario for which my research was unable to dis-
cover any case law is the hypothetical and easily imaginable case where
two parents disagree over whether or not to donate their child's or-
113 Summary judgment in the case was denied on December 21, 1973. Id. at 1076.
The case had originally been filed in February 1972. Id. at 1066. The divorce itself
began in August 1969, id. at 1067, and the fire that killed the children occurred in
February of 1970. Id. at 1068. That means the dispute that formed the core of the
conflict between these two people began in 1969 and was still unresolved as 1974
dawned.
114 See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
115 941 F. Supp. 1483 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
116 287 F.3d 786 (9th Cir. 2002).
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gans. This dispute could also manifest itself as two adult children who
have a dispute over the donation of their parent's organs. In that situ-
ation, the need for a speedy resolution would arise because of the
short window of opportunity in which to harvest viable organs. If the
surviving next of kin are unable to reach an agreement about how to
proceed, litigation would appear to be the only option-most likely in
the form of a temporary injunction.
D. Problems with Traditional Adjudication' 
17
The above cases demonstrate several problems with adjudication
and settlement, the traditional model, as a method of dispute resolu-
tion in the context of burial disputes. Five primary failures of the
traditional model emerge. These failures are: inability to deal with
matters in a timely fashion, extraordinary expense, the winner-take-all
outcome and consequential damage to close relationships, failure to
deal with the interests of all of the parties involved, and a lack of ex-
pertise in dealing with these issues or lack of flexibility to create inno-
vative solutions.
As demonstrated clearly by commentators, common sense, and
the cases introduced above, the traditional model is slow. 118 It simply
takes a lot of time for courts to act, especially if the dispute proceeds
all the way to trial. For the twelve-month period ending on March 31,
2002, it took a median time of 8.1 months for a federal civil case to
proceed from filing to disposition. 11 9 Burial disputes, for the most
part, demand quick action. Bodies must be buried, organs must be
harvested, and healing for the next of kin must begin. Oftentimes
decisions need to be made quickly and, once made, they are irreversi-
ble. The traditional model, adjudication combined with settlement,
has not proven itself an adequate vehicle for timely resolution of these
pressing disputes. There must be a quicker alternative to resolve bur-
ial disputes.
117 Earlier in this Note, I alternatively used the terms "adjudication" and
"traditional model" to describe litigation. Many commentators and scholars classify
arbitration as a form of adjudication because a third party is the one deciding the
dispute. In spite of this, for the purpose of simplicity, I will consider arbitration
under the rubric of nonadjudicative.
118 See supra Part II.A; see also ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CASE LOAD STATISTICS 56-58 (2002). The limitation of this resource is that it
only documents cases in the federal judiciary. As reported by Marc Galanter, more
than 98% of civil cases are filed in state courts. However, one might accurately pre-
sume that these two systems would display parallel trends. See Galanter, supra note 55,
at 6.
119 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 118, at 56.
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Secondly, the lengthy nature of the adjudicative process, com-
bined with the high cost of lawyers, makes resolving these disputes
extremely expensive. 120 Often, when someone's motivation for creat-
ing a controversy is no more then an innocent desire to see the de-
ceased's wishes fulfilled, high cost will prevent those wishes from
being realized. Yet that high cost does not make the wishes any less
important. Justice and correct outcomes, it can be argued, should not
be contingent on the size of the wallet of the person seeking the cor-
rect outcome. This is especially true in the sensitive and painful time
that follows the death of a loved one.
One of the major criticisms of the adversary system is that it com-
pels participants to view each other as combatants or opponents.
121
The conception of a lawsuit is that it is a zero-sum game. This can be
seen as especially true in the burial dispute context, where often vic-
tory will mean "getting your way" as to how "dad" is going to be bur-
ied. Whether one wins or loses a trial of any variety, the parties are
likely to have developed a strong dislike for their opponent at the
conclusion of it, especially when staring at large legal bills and months
of effort wasted. This animosity and adversarial current that drenches
the traditional adjudicative model is especially poisonous in the burial
dispute paradigm. The death of a loved one is painful enough for
most people, but the effect of a long and expensive trial on the con-
tinuing relationships of the disputants would be devastating. In most
cases, the disputants are family members, like Bobby-Jo and John
Henry Williams, who will remain family members for a long time. The
collateral issues and effects of the dispute, which both contributed to
120 See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a
System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1996) (noting that "[t]rials are the
most visible aspect of our system of adjudication, and they show it at its worst," and
that "[t]hey are the slowest, most expensive and most contentious cases, in which
compromise has failed and in which the verdict is most likely to seem arbitrary or
extreme"); see also supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text (noting how, in the Ted
Williams case, one of the key factors that forced Mrs. Ferrell out of the litigation was
rapidly expanding cost).
121 See, e.g., LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND
LAwYERS 210 (1987); Lon L. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L.
REv. 305, 325 (1971) (noting that, in complex situations, "the mediator will have to
enlarge considerably the range of his concerns and in the process have to content
himself with something short of perfection in the achievement of his more familiar
objectives"); Dwight Golann, Is Legal Mediation a Process of Repair-or Separation?, 7
HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 301, 302 (2002) (finding "a dichotomy... between what law
schools teach about the [mediation] process and the way many litigators describe it in
practice").
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its creation, and often hamper its resolution, will only be exacerbated
by the competition of trial.
Courts are very good at resolving disputes when the issues and
the law are clear. The converse is true as well. When the law is un-
clear or an issue is novel, courts frequently struggle to fashion the
appropriate type of relief. 22 The adjudicative model's lack of flexibil-
ity and expertise is a serious handicap to the effective resolution of
burial disputes. Frequently, creative solutions to the problem could
end the dispute. For example, suppose that son A wants dad buried,
and son B thinks that dad should be cremated. Under the adjudica-
tive model, if they go to court, there are only two options available to
the court in fashioning relief-cremation or burial. This myopic view
constrains courts, hiding the potential that there is a third or even
fourth option that may be available. A method of resolving this con-
troversy that utilized a decisionmaker or advisor who is familiar with
burial and interment and is more flexible might be better able to pro-
pose those solutions and vindicate the wishes of all the parties. Courts
simply are not flexible or knowledgeable enough to deviate from the
relief requested by the parties themselves.
A final problem with the adjudicative model is its lack of ability to
deal with the multiplicity of parties that frequently present themselves
in a burial dispute. The American adjudication system categorizes the
parties as plaintiffs and defendants. 123 There is no room for an inter-
mediate position; the choice is narrowed to two sides. While a third
party, the state, may appear via statutes and rules of decision, that role
is limited because of a lack of either common or statutory law dealing
with the burial of bodies.
Thus, it is clear that the current model for resolving burial dis-
putes is seriously lacking in its capacity to effectively terminate these
controversies. In the next Part of the Note, I present alternatives to
the current model and attempt to determine if these alternatives
122 For a high profile example of this problem, one need look no further than the
integration of American schools-a process that began in the early 1950s and contin-
ues today. See generally Peter M. Shane, School Desegregation Remedies and the Fair Govern-
ance of Schools, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1041, 1043 (1984) (attempting to "fill [the] vacuum
in the Supreme Court's remedial jurisprudence by fashioning a remedial theory
against which the utility and legitimacy of busing, and of school desegregation reme-
dies generally, can be assessed").
123 While there is a potential in the Federal Rules for third parties to join through
mandatory and permissive joinder, the courts are still constrained by the "v" in the
middle of every case caption. Adjudication in America is a contest with two sides and
no more. See Ellen E. Sward, A History of the Civil Jury Trial in the United States, 51 U.
KAN. L. REV. 347 passim (2003).
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would achieve better results in this area. I also seek to demonstrate
why it is that these methods have not been used more frequently.
III. ALTERNATIVE METHODS
Thus far, this Note has primarily explored traditional methods of
resolving disputes. That description necessarily implies that there ex-
ist nontraditional methods, and this is certainly true. The litigation
explosion and increased court dockets of the 1960s spawned in-
creased interest in nontraditional methods of resolving conflicts that
formally developed "early in the century."1 24 These procedures are
commonly referred to under the general term alternative dispute res-
olution (ADR) mechanisms. The academic and jurisprudential think-
ing about ADR often is described under the rubric of the ADR
movement. Black's Law Dictionary defines ADR as "procedures for set-
fling disputes by means other than litigation; e.g., by arbitration, me-
diation, mini-trials." 125 The next section of this Note briefly describes
the development of ADR as a movement in general and its growth and
acceptance. I then turn to particular types of ADR, specifically media-
tion, arbitration, and hybrid techniques, describing their strengths
and weaknesses. Concluding this Part of the Note is a section in
which I apply the various ADR mechanisms to burial disputes to deter-
mine their usefulness in this area.
A. ADR: The Growth and Development of a Movement
Nonlitigious models of dispute resolution have been employed
throughout the world and across this country for almost as long as law
has been administered. For example, for over "60 years" arbitration
has been used in many contexts to resolve disputes. 126 However, it was
not until awareness and discussion of the "litigation explosion" began
to peak in the early 1970s that ADR began to gather strength as a full
fledged legal reform movement. A key event in this development was
the Roscoe E. Pound Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfac-
tion with the Administration ofJustice (Pound Conference) convened
by former Chief Justice Warren Burger. 127 At that conference, "lead-
ing jurists and lawyers expressed concern about increased expense
124 STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION,
AND OTHER PROCESSES 7 (3d ed. 1999).
125 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 50, at 29.
126 GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 124, at 6.
127 Addresses Delivered at the National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction
with the Administration of Justice, 70 F.R.D. 79 (1976) [hereinafter Pound Conference
Report]; see also NoiAN-HALEY, supra note 49, at 5 (noting that "[s]ome of the papers
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and delay for parties in a crowded justice system."1 28 The conference
created a task force that adopted Professor Frank Sander's idea of the
"multi-door courthouse," a concept that conceived of the courthouse
as an all purpose dispute resolution center.129 Over the last twenty-
five years "[n]o field of law has experienced more growth or had a
greater impact on the law ... than alternative dispute resolution,"
130
and the ADR movement has expanded beyond the legal community
and has pulled in endorsements and criticism from fields such as psy-
chology, sociology, and anthropology.13 1 At the same time, ADR re-
formers have struggled to find a place for ADR against staunch
defenders of traditional methods. At times ADR's critics have been
both many and highly vocal. This criticism has not gone unnoticed,
but the movement has continued to grow.
Many of the early criticisms focused on the ambitious nature of
the movement itself, which tended to see alternative, or sometimes
called appropriate, dispute resolution as a tonic for all of the legal
system's ills. 132 In response to criticisms, by the early 1980s, the move-
ment had narrowed its ambitions and agenda. Yet, this narrowing did
not stop the criticism. Commentators "began to report research that
challenged every premise of the movement's call for public sup-
port."13 3 As this past century drew to a close, the fact of life was that
many facets and usages of ADR were here to stay. Thus, the focus
"shifted from experimentation to institutionalization."' 34 While in
some contexts, use of alternative methods is firmly entrenched-for
example, management-labor relations where arbitration is a fixture of
disputes' 5-the ultimate extent of alternative dispute resolution's
usefulness remains to be seen. Additionally, the extent to which ADR
has met its objectives by reducing court backlog, speeding resolutions,
and reducing costs, among others, has not yet been determined. Fi-
nally, there remain many barriers to a more complete implementation
which emerged from this conference ... formed the basic understanding of dispute
resolution today").
128 GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 124, at 7 (citation omitted).
129 Id.; Pound Conference Report, supra note 127, at 111.
130 Richard Chernick, Alternative Dispute Resolution: The Growth and Maturation of
Mediation, L.A. LAW., Mar. 2002, at 8.
131 NOLN-HALEY, supra note 49, at 5-6.
132 See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (argu-
ing that settlement "should be treated ... as a highly problematic technique for
streamlining dockets").
133 GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 124, at 8-9.
134 Id. at 9.
135 Id. at 233.
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of ADR procedures-some of them justified and some of them simply
the result of inertia or entrenched interests.
B. A Sampling of Mechanisms and an Application to Burial Disputes
Not all alternative dispute resolution techniques are created
equal. In addition, as ADR methods grow in usage they may begin no
longer to be seen as alternatives to the traditional methods. For ex-
ample, negotiated settlements are not adjudication, yet they are such
a fundamental part of the notice pleading structure that many jurists
and commentators see them as adjudicative in nature. 136 There is a
wide ranging normative consensus in describing several ADR meth-
ods. In the interest of brevity, I will attempt to focus on two primary
methods of dispute resolution with cursory treatment of some hybrid
options. I believe that the use of either mediation or arbitration is the
best way to resolve burial disputes.
Subsequent portions of this Note will describe these two
processes. However, as a starting point it is useful to discuss the fea-
tures these two methods share with almost all ADR methods. First,
and perhaps foremost, is informality. Mediation and, to a slightly
lesser extent, arbitration take great pains to maintain a level of infor-
mality that contrasts sharply with the rigidly defined procedures and
practices of the courthouse.1 37 In addition, mediation and arbitration
are both designed to be low cost. However, unlike a judge in a court-
room, parties must pay for the services of the mediator or arbitrator,
which occasionally frustrates that intention. Furthermore, neither the
mediator nor the arbitrator has independent power to enforce the
result of their processes. This is a bit of an overstatement because if a
contract clearly stipulates final and binding arbitration, then a court
will usually enforce the result. However, there is the slim likelihood
that a court will not enforce the contract due to some procedural er-
ror or other concern about unconscionability.
Of course, major differences also characterize mediation and ar-
bitration.' 38 For example, while I noted above that both are informal
processes, arbitration has grown more formal and institutionalized
with its increasing use over the past several decades. A further crucial
difference is that, in mediation, the parties are the ones who ulti-
mately decide the issue. In contrast, in arbitration, the arbitrator
136 See, e.g., Gross & Syverud, supra note 120, at 4.
137 GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 124, at 4-5 tbl. 1-1.
138 See Robin Hoberman, Mediation: A Nonadversarial Alternative to a Win-Lose Sys-
tem, 90 ILL. B.J. 588, 588 (2002) (describing mediation as "nonadversarial and negotia-
tion-based, while arbitration and litigation are both adversarial and proof-based").
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often will decide the issues for the parties. Thus, mediation can be
seen as more cooperative, where the "focus ... is on the communica-
tion between the parties, not on the presentation of proof to a neu-
tral."'139 Of course, this also means that mediation is not outcome
certain; there is no guarantee that mediation will result in a settle-
ment of the case at hand.
In the next subsections of this Note, I introduce both mediation
and arbitration in detail and demonstrate their potential for applica-
tion in the context of burial disputes. Following this is an investiga-
tion of the reasons for the failure to use these resolution devices and
why they may not be used in the future in spite of, or because of, their
relative "fit" for this type of dispute.
1. Arbitration
Arbitration is the senior fellow in the department of alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms. It has existed since the time of my-
thology and the ancient Greeks and has continued in active usage
throughout human history.140 In addition to being the oldest alterna-
tive dispute resolution mechanism, it is also the process that most re-
sembles traditional methods of adjudication and the "most formalized
alternative to the court adjudication of disputes.' 14 1 Its history in
America "antedate [s] the American Revolution in New York and sev-
eral other colonies."' 42 In contemporary American society, arbitra-
tion first came into widespread usage in the 1940s, and today disputes
ranging from credit card billing controversies to setting the salary of
Major League Baseball Players use arbitration. It truly is the grand-
daddy of alternatives to traditional adjudication, although its wide-
spread usage and increasing institutionalization has led some to
criticize its effectiveness as a true alternative.
a. How Arbitration Works
Arbitration, like all alternative dispute resolution processes, is a
difficult creature to describe. This is primarily because it is chame-
leon-like. Unlike the traditional adjudicative processes, arbitration is
"designed by the parties to serve their particular needs," and therefore
"it cannot be defined or described in a manner that will encompass all
139 Id.
140 See FRAcEs KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION 3 (1972) (noting that
"[c] ommercial arbitration was known to the desert caravans in Marco Polo's time and
was a common practice among Phoenician and Greek traders").
141 NotAN-HALE, supra note 49, at 119.
142 GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 124, at 233.
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arbitration elements." 14 3 However, there are certain features that are
generally common to all types of arbitration.
Traditional models of arbitration "contemplate [ ] a voluntary pro-
cess where parties submit a dispute to a neutral person for a deci-
sion." 144 There are also nontraditional models of arbitration where
the decision to arbitrate is not entirely voluntary, i.e., court annexed
or compulsory arbitration. In these situations, however, the resolu-
tion of the dispute is generally not binding on the parties.
One of the main features of traditional arbitration is limited dis-
covery. Limited discovery increases the speed of the process and low-
ers the costs. 145 The process of arbitration itself is very much like
traditional adjudication, with either side to the dispute presenting
their proof to the neutral third party. The resolution of the dispute,
however, is much different than traditional disputes. In arbitration,
juries are never used. The arbitrator decides questions of both fact
and law. In addition, outside of the labor context, "arbitrators (unlike
judges) commonly do not write reasoned opinions attempting to ex-
plain and justify their decisions." 146 This gives arbitrators greater flex-
ibility in announcing their decisions. It also means that the principle
of stare decisis generally does not bind arbitrators, leaving them to
decide issues in a manner they see as fair. 147 Furthermore, the ability
of the arbitrator to avoid a written opinion increases the speed and
decreases the cost of using arbitration.
b. Goals of Arbitration and Criticisms
Arbitration has many goals as an alternative to adjudication. Fun-
damentally, the goal is to arrive at a more just result than adjudication
would permit. This concept of justice encompasses more than simply
the outcome of the decision, but also the process required to arrive at
that decision. Several of the theoretical advantages of arbitration over
traditional court adjudications include the expertise of the deci-
sionmakers, finality of the decision due to lack of appeals mecha-
nisms, privacy of the proceedings, procedural informality, low cost,
and speed.'14  It is quite easy to see how many of those advantages
could be desirable in the burial dispute context.
143 Id.
144 NOLAN-HALEY, supra note 49, at 124.
145 GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 124, at 233-34.
146 JOHN S. MURRAY ET AL., PROCESSES OF DisPurE REsOLUTION 514 (2d ed. 1996).
147 Id.
148 GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 124, at 234.
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However, critics of arbitration have pointed out that in practice
arbitration may not be faster or more efficient than traditional mod-
els, and that the rush to judgment inherent in arbitration results in
incorrect or unjust results.149 In addition, many have pointed out that
arbitration benefits repeat players because they become familiar with
the process. Furthermore, one of the major criticisms of arbitration,
particularly final and binding arbitration imposed by boilerplate in
many commercial contracts, is that it operates as a barrier to the
achievement of justice because it increases costs to litigants. That crit-
icism focuses primarily on the fact that, unlike state provided court
adjudication, the parties pay for the arbitrator. This puts the indigent
plaintiff at a disadvantage, because if she lacks the funds to pay for the
arbitrator, she may be unable to seek relief.'
50
A conclusive answer to whether arbitration as a process is meeting
its lofty goals is beyond the scope of this Note. There is already a
wealth of scholarly commentary on the subject. It is essential to note
that it is not a panacea to the problems of the traditional civil justice
system; however, it may present an attractive model for use in resolv-
ing burial disputes.
2. Mediation
Mediation is a relative newcomer to the field of alternative dis-
pute resolution, yet it has been enormously well received in its brief
stay on the block. In the words of one commentator, "mediation is
the most important [ADR] innovation and will provide the most last-
ing benefit to law and society." 151 Yet, as with arbitration, mediation
in some form has existed for centuries, and in some ways "probably
predates the formal creation and enforcement of law."1 52 Today, a
wide variety of conflicts in American society are resolved through me-
diation, and it has its share of both proponents and critics.
149 See NoLAN-HALRY, supra note 49, at 125.
150 See, e.g., EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279 (2002) (holding that an em-
ployer-employee arbitration agreement mandating the arbitration of employment re-
lated disputes does not bar the EEOC from pursuing victim specific judicial relief in
an ADA enforcement action); Ann C. Hodges, Can Compulsory Arbitration be Reconciled
with Section 7 Rights?, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 173, 174-76 (2003) (examining
.whether the NLRA's right to engage in concerted activity protects employees from
being forced to agree to arbitration of employment claims as a condition of
employment").
151 Chernick, supra note 130, at 8.
152 MURRAY ET AL, supra note 146, at 294.
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a. What is the Mediation Process?
Mediation is a process where disputants invite a third party into a
dispute to facilitate its resolution. Mediation is "generally understood
to be a short-term, structured, task-oriented, participatory interven-
tion process."'153 Theorists and scholars typically divide mediation
into two subfields, evaluative and facilitative, and there is a great deal
of academic debate about whether this division should even occur. 154
In facilitative mediation, the third party attempts to encourage the
parties to find common ground through "information exchange and
creativity." 155 In facilitative mediation, the third party does not give
the parties an opinion as to the outcome of the case, but acts only to
help the parties to "reach their own joint decision on a reasonable
settlement or solution."'156 In contrast, an evaluative mediator may
"give an opinion or recommendation on settlement value or some
other solution.' 5 7 However, even in evaluative mediation, the solu-
tion always comes from the parties themselves.
The process varies greatly from mediation to mediation, typically
depending upon, independent of the evaluative or facilitative role of
the mediator, the style and skills of the mediator. Usually, however,
mediation begins with the two parties presenting their "case" to the
other side and to the mediator. The mediator asks the parties several
questions while still together to get a better feel for the issues and
interests of the parties. At that point, the mediator often breaks the
parties up into private caucuses and will attempt to work out a deal.
This helps the two parties to see the issues alone without constantly
tying them up in the "conflict" of adversarial proceedings. One of the
prime reasons why mediation succeeds where traditional methods
often fail is because of the confidential relationship the mediator is
obligated to maintain with both parties. The mediator must not dis-
close any confidential information that either party chooses to share
with her in private. However, that information may help the mediator
to facilitate the eventual resolution of the dispute because she has ac-
cess to more perfect information and may be able to construct a
unique and special remedy better suited to the interests and not the
positions of the parties.
A court may order mediation, or parties may elect to mediate vol-
untarily or through contractual arrangement. Increasingly, "disputes
153 NOLAN-HALEY, supra note 49, at 56.
154 See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 124, at 139-40.
155 JOHN W. COOLEY, MEDIATION ADvocAcY 18 (2002).
156 Id.
157 Id.
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of any size are now mediated early in the litigation process .... [Par-
ties] now routinely schedule a mediation without urging from the
court and often prior to filing a suit."
1 58
b. Objectives of Mediation and Critical Acclaim and Disclaim
Increasingly, mediation has moved from its origins as a technique
designed to "get to yes" to become a device for "repairing relation-
ships." 159 On one hand, mediation has been hailed as a device not
only to ensure just results, but also to repair relationships where they
otherwise would have been critically damaged. On the other hand,
"[c] ivil litigators... tend to speak of the mediation process in a differ-
ent way." 160 Attorneys see mediation as a method to "facilitate distrib-
utive, often adversarial, bargaining over money."'16 1 In addition to
these conflicting goals, mediation is designed to operate quickly to
resolve disputes in an informal and inexpensive way. Furthermore,
the proponents of mediation claim that one of its hallmarks, and the
reason why it is seen as being able to restore relationships, is its flexi-
ble nature, enabling the parties themselves to come up with creative,
appropriate solutions. 162 This creative flexibility also allows mediated
solutions to consider and include a greater diversity of interests. In
fact, mediation may procedurally include more than just two parties,
and the mediator may consider the desires of many groups in arriving
at a conclusion.
Does mediation accomplish its goals? In Golann's empirical
study, he concluded that disputants were satisfied with mediation be-
cause "it provides a fundamentally different kind of settlement pro-
cess."'163 His data suggested that "disputants can realize important
psychological and emotional benefits from mediation even when their
relationship is not repaired."164 This benefit is in addition to settling
the dispute. The proof of mediation's success is in the pudding-
private parties increasingly use it and states have continued to enact
statutes encouraging or requiring its usage in a number of contexts.
This is not to suggest that mediation is a cure all and that all
disputes should go to mediation. Mediation is not without its disad-
vantages. Many complain that mediation changes the process of dis-
158 Chernick, supra note 130, at 12.
159 Golann, supra note 121, at 301.
160 Id. at 302.
161 Id.
162 Danny Ciraco, Forget the Mechanics and Bring in the Gardeners, 9 U. BALT. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 47, 65-66 (2000).
163 Golann, supra note 121, at 335.
164 Id.
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pute resolution and, as a result, changes the balance of power
between the two parties, and that it mayJead to wrong outcomes.
65
Furthermore, the informality of mediation means that it lacks the pro-
cedural protections of the traditional adversarial system. 166 In addi-
tion, mediation is generally focused on a fair outcome, which means
that there often is no conclusion of who was "right" or "wrong.'
'1 67
This suggests that parties who need conclusions as to "fault" may be
dissatisfied with mediation. In addition, while some experimental
cost-free public mediation programs exist, 168 in the majority of cases
the parties will need to pay for the mediator and other costs them-
selves. As mediation is not a guarantee of a solution, but merely a
process, there is the possibility that the parties will pay for the media-
tion but not reach a settlement and have to go to court for relief
anyway.
IV. APPLYING THE ALTERNATIVE METHODS TO BURIAL DisPUTEs
Now that I have briefly sketched a few of the alternatives availa-
ble, I consider whether they would be better suited to resolving burial
disputes than conventional litigation. Professors Frank Sander and
Stephen Goldberg wrote an article that serves as a useful guide to se-
lecting mechanisms to fit various disputes. 169 In Fitting the Forum to the
Fuss, Professors Sander and Goldberg designed a matrix-like system
that allows a disputant to select the goals of their dispute and compare
those objectives to the capabilities of dispute resolution systems.
170
For example, their matrix categorizes courts as weak at cost reduction,
speed, and privacy. However, courts do rate highly in vindication, is-
suing a neutral opinion, and maximizing or, minimizing recovery.
Given my criticisms of the traditional processes' failures to resolve bur-
ial disputes above, this categorization system is extremely helpful in
165 See Richard Delgado, Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1359, 1391-99 (1985).
166 See NoIAN-HALE', supra note 49, at 59 (noting mediation's independence from
the judicial system).
167 See Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion Movement is Re-Shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN. ST. L. REv. 165, 181-84 (2003).
168 See Tina Drake Zimmerman, Representation in ADR and Access to Justice for Legal
Services Clients, 10 GEO.J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 181, 193 (2003) (describing the free
mediation services provided by the Kankakee Center for Conflict Resolution in Kan-
kakee, Illinois).
169 Frank E.A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A User-
Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOT. J. 49 (1994).
170 Id. passim.
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comparing and contrasting the "fit" of dispute resolution mechanisms
to these conflicts.
A. Will They Work?
To determine if the alternatives to the traditional system will
work, it is first necessary to identify the goals of disputants in burial
disputes. This Note previously discussed most of the goals of the dis-
putants. 171 In these conflicts, especially pre-burial and organ dona-
tion disputes, quickness, finality, low cost, informality, and flexibility
are all essential for the resolution mechanism to be effective. In addi-
tion, all of these disputes do need, in some respect, to have legal au-
thority, because the deceased may have a will that must be followed.
Furthermore, the processes selected here must, ideally, be capable of
dealing with the highly emotional demands of the parties about a sen-
sitive subject.
This section will analyze the alternatives under the Sander-
Goldberg system. If the client's goals are speed, maintaining or im-
proving the relationship, minimizing costs, and receiving a neutral
opinion, then mediation receives a Sander-Goldberg score of nine,
arbitration gets a score of six, and trial would receive a score of
three. 172 Thus, mediation would seem to be the best mechanism to
choose for this dispute. Arbitration would also satisfy more of the par-
ties' goals than going to court. This result makes good sense. As illus-
trated above, mediation's goals are to provide inexpensive, flexible,
and quick dispute resolution. Furthermore, one of the objectives of
the process is to empower the disputants to come together to find
their own solution to the problem, which is essential to restoring frac-
tured relationships.1 73 In a burial dispute, which will usually involve
family members, the restoration of damaged relationships is some-
thing that should be highly valued. Empowering the disputants to
reach a peaceful, self-crafted resolution may avoid or resolve collateral
disputes such as divorce/child custody disputes or will controversies
that may emerge following a death.
174
An additional factor that the Sander-Goldberg matrix does not
consider is the multiplicity of parties to a burial dispute. Mediation
has the advantage of being able to consider the interests of several
171 See supra Parts I-1.
172 See Sander & Goldberg, supra note 169, at 53 tbl.1.
173 Golann, supra note 121, at 301-02.
174 See, e.g., Tully v. Pate, 372 F. Supp. 1064 (D.S.C. 1973); see also supra notes
70-86 and accompanying text (discussing the Ted Williams case, which featured is-
sues about the disbursement of Williams's estate).
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different parties. For example, if there are three children fighting
over how or where to bury their father, a mediator could easily meet
with all three of them. If they wanted to go to court, there would be
no space for accommodating three adversaries' solutions.
However, not all the characteristics of a burial dispute argue in
favor of mediation. For example, mediation is nonbinding, which
may be a disadvantage in this context. If one of the goals of a mecha-
nism in resolving burial disputes, particularly pre-burial disputes, is to
allow for some sense of finality, then mediation may not be authorita-
tive enough for this purpose. The very ability of mediation to enter-
tain multiple parties also means that some interested parties may not
be included in a voluntary mediation. The disallowed party may then
attempt to interfere with the mediated settlement by going to court,
thus eliminating all that was gained by using mediation in the first
place.
Arbitration may offer some benefits in resolving burial disputes,
particularly where there is a will that must be interpreted and en-
forced to honor the wishes of the deceased. Comparing the Ted Wil-
liams case, 175 where there was a will, with a will-less scenario, i.e., the
death of a divorced parent's children, highlights this concern. In Ted
Williams's case, the dispute focused on identifying Ted's wishes. If
there had been no will, the goal of resolving the conflict would be in
seeking an agreement between the surviving relatives. Thus, in a situ-
ation where there is no will, mediation may be best. However, where
there is a will, arbitration may be more appropriate because a will acts
as a guiding hand for the dispute, and commentators have argued
that mediation may be most desirable where there is a "lack of decisive
case law."'1
76
B. Obstacles to Use
If mediation and arbitration seem so suitable to resolving burial
disputes, why are they not used more often? The easiest answers are
inertia and ignorance. Even though these explanations are simple,
they remain the best. Many criticisms of mediation and arbitration
claim that they are not really cheaper for plaintiffs because they have
to pay for the forum. 177 Commentators contrast this payment system
with the state courts.178 There, the forum is provided cost-free and
175 See supra Part II.C.1.
176 See, e.g., NoLAN-HALEv, supra note 49, at 116.
177 See, e.g., Reginald Alleyne, Arbitrators' Fees: The Dagger in the Heart of Mandatory
Arbitration for Statutory Discrimination Claims, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 30 (2003).
178 Id.
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plaintiffs are normally represented on a contingent fee basis. There-
fore, in your average dispute-for example, a car accident-the plain-
tiff does not have any costs if she does not win. However, the
contingent fee system and its benefits do not arise as much in the
burial dispute context, where damage rewards are not really at stake
(except in organ donation controversies). Therefore, both parties to
a burial dispute are already paying for their attorneys up front, so any
method that will reduce the amount of billable hours is probably de-
sirable; both mediation and arbitration accomplish the goal of reduc-
ing billable hours.
In connection with inertia and ignorance, speed and habit pro-
vide another reason why ADR mechanisms have gone unused in this
scenario. Many lawyers are unfamiliar with ADR and thus, when they
are drafting wills or first advising clients how to stop the potential cre-
mation of their relative, they do not consider using ADR. When an
attorney needs to act quickly to aid her client, she turns to the familiar
and traditional mechanisms because she knows they will work.
ADR usage could be encouraged in this field in several ways. The
first and least contentious way to encourage its use is through greater
education of attorneys, particularly probate and trusts and estates at-
torneys. If trusts attorneys draft their clients' wills with mediation or
arbitration provisions, they can help their clients and their clients' rel-
atives resolve disputes. A second step could be to educate judges
about the availability of ADR to help them resolve more cases, clear
their docket, and deliver justice cheaply and quickly. One way to assist
judges would be for states to pass laws encouraging the use of media-
tion in general, or at least in burial disputes in particular.
In the organ donation context, hospitals could provide parties
with mediators on site to help them resolve their conflicts in a timely
manner that would permit the harvesting of the organs before it be-
comes too late. In addition, state statutes authorizing organ donation
could specify the use of ADR procedures for the resolution of contro-
versies between family members or between organ bank personnel
and families.
CONCLUSION
As America's population continues to grow, our courts are bound
to become increasingly crowded and unable to resolve disputes in an
adequate fashion. The litigation explosion of the past thirty years has
seen a corresponding growth in alternative dispute resolution mecha-
nisms. This correlation is more then just causally related. Crowded
courts initially forced the usage of ADR methods to relieve a backlog
1 18o [VOL- 79:3
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of disputes, but over time increased usage of ADR has highlighted
some of the failures of our traditional adjudicative model. I believe
that the example of burial disputes provides further evidence of the
weaknesses of litigation as a dispute resolution model and of the
American civil justice system in general.
A "one-size-fits-all" mentality characterizes the traditional model
of dispute resolution in America. While this approach may enjoy the
benefits of simplicity, it has proven to be expensive and prone to
crowding. As this Note has shown, not all disputes are the same. A
car accident does not involve the same issues that a fuss over burying a
relative involves. Yet, our court system would use the same mecha-
nisms to resolve both arguments. As illustrated, this does not make
sense and prevents people from pressing their claims, or it drags
others into expensive and prolonged "disputes" which resemble a
form of government sanctioned blackmail. So long as America main-
tains a "notice pleading" system with its low barrier to entry, extensive
and expensive discovery, and summary judgment as the only early exit
strategy, burial disputes will not be resolved effectively and the system
will thwart just results.
Ensuring fulfillment of the burial wishes of a deceased loved one
should not require their surviving kin to enter into time-consuming
and costly litigation. The goals of clients in these kinds of disputes
include a desire to see a final decision quickly-at a low cost. Addi-
tional disputants prefer to arrive at their result in a fashion that can
repair relationships harmed by the disagreement. These goals are not
limited to burial disputes; they apply in many others as well. It is a
reasonable demand to have a flexible justice system that can better
meet the goals of disputants; one size does not fit all. This Note joins
the many that have preceded it in the ADR movement and suggests
that greater usage of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms would
be a much needed reform of our civil justice system-one designed to
provide justice to disputants in burial cases.
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